What Is Propaganda, and How Does It Differ From Persuasion?

Propaganda is a form of communication that attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. Persuasion is interactive and attempts to satisfy the needs of both persuader and persuadee. A model of propaganda depicts how elements of informative and persuasive communication may be incorporated into propagandistic communication, thus distinguishing propaganda as a specific class of communication. References are made to past theories of rhetoric that indicate propaganda has had few systematic theoretical treatments prior to the 20th century. Public opinion and behavioral change can be affected by propaganda.

Propaganda has been studied as history, journalism, political science, sociology, and psychology, as well as from an interdisciplinary perspective. To study propaganda as history is to examine the practices of propagandists as events and the subsequent events as possible effects of propaganda. To consider propaganda as journalism is to understand how news management or “spin” shapes information, emphasizing positive features and downplaying negative ones, casting institutions in a favorable light. To examine propaganda in the light of political science is to analyze the
ideologies of the practitioners and the dissemination and impact of public opinion. To approach propaganda as sociology is to look at social movements and the counterpropaganda that emerges in opposition. To investigate propaganda as psychology is to determine its effects on individuals. Propaganda is also viewed by some scholars as inherent thought and practice in mass culture. A more recent trend that draws on most of these allied fields is the study of propaganda as a purveyor of ideology and, to this end, is largely a study of how dominant ideological meanings are constructed within the mass media (Burnett, 1989, pp. 127–137). Ethnographic research is one way to determine whether the people on the receiving end accept or resist dominant ideological meanings.

This book approaches the study of propaganda as a type of communication. Persuasion, another category of communication, is also examined. The terms *propaganda* and *persuasion* have been used interchangeably in the literature on propaganda, as well as in everyday speech. Propaganda employs persuasive strategies, but it differs from persuasion in purpose. A communication approach to the study of propaganda enables us to isolate its communicative variables, to determine the relationship of message to context, to examine intentionality, to examine the responses and responsibilities of the audience, and to trace the development of propagandistic communication as a process.

We believe there is a need to evaluate propaganda in a contemporary context free from value-laden definitions. Our objectives are (a) to provide a concise examination of propaganda and persuasion, (b) to examine the role of propaganda as an aspect of communication studies, and (c) to analyze propaganda as part of social, religious, and political systems throughout history and contemporary times.

### Propaganda Defined

*Propaganda*, in the most neutral sense, means to disseminate or promote particular ideas. In Latin, it means “to propagate” or “to sow.” In 1622, the Vatican established the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*, meaning the sacred congregation for propagating the faith of the Roman Catholic Church. Because the propaganda of the Roman Catholic Church had as its intent spreading the faith to the New World, as well as opposing Protestantism, the word *propaganda* lost its neutrality, and subsequent usage has rendered the term pejorative. To identify a message as propaganda is to suggest something negative and dishonest. Words frequently used as synonyms for *propaganda* are *lies, distortion, deceit, manipulation, mind*
control, psychological warfare, brainwashing, and palaver. Resistance to the word propaganda is illustrated by the following example. When the legendary film director John Ford assumed active duty as a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy and chief of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, he was asked by his editor, Robert Parrish, if his film, *The Battle of Midway*, was going to be a propaganda film. After a long pause, Ford replied, “Don’t you ever let me hear you use that word again in my presence as long as you’re under my command” (Doherty, 1993, pp. 25–26). Ford had filmed the actual battle of Midway, but he also included flashbacks of an American family at home that implied that an attack on them was an attack on every American. Ford designed the film to appeal to the American people to strengthen their resolve and belief in the war effort, but he resisted the idea of making films for political indoctrination. According to our definition, *The Battle of Midway* was a white propaganda film, for it was neither deceitful nor false, the source was known, but it shaped viewer perceptions and furthered the desired intent of the filmmaker to vilify the enemy and encourage American patriotism.

Terms implying propaganda that have gained popularity today are *spin* and *news management*, referring to a coordinated strategy to minimize negative information and present in a favorable light a story that could be damaging to self-interests. *Spin* is often used with reference to the manipulation of political information; therefore, press secretaries and public relations officers are referred to as “spin doctors” when they attempt to launder the news (Kurtz, 1998). Besides being associated with unethical, harmful, and unfair tactics, propaganda is also commonly defined as “organized persuasion” (DeVito, 1986, p. 239). Persuasion differs from propaganda, as we will see later in this chapter, but the term is often used as a catch-all for suspicious rhetoric. Sproule (1994) references propaganda as organized mass persuasion with covert intent and poor or nonexistent reasoning: “Propaganda represents the work of large organizations or groups to win over the public for special interests through a massive orchestration of attractive conclusions packaged to conceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of sound supporting reasons” (p. 8).

When the use of *propaganda* emphasizes purpose, the term is associated with control and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist. Deliberate attempt is linked with a clear institutional ideology and objective. In fact, the purpose of propaganda is to send out an ideology to an audience with a related objective. Whether it is a government agency attempting to instill a massive wave of patriotism in a national audience to support a war effort,
a terrorist network enlisting followers in a jihad, a military leader trying to frighten the enemy by exaggerating the strength of its army, a corporation pursuing a credible image to maintain its legitimacy among its clientele, or a company seeking to malign a rival to deter competition for its product, a careful and predetermined plan of prefabricated symbol manipulation is used to communicate an objective to an audience. The objective that is sought endeavors to reinforce or modify the attitudes, or the behavior, or both of an audience.

Many scholars have grappled with a definition of the word *propaganda*. Jacques Ellul (1965, p. xv) focused on propaganda as technique itself (notably, psychological manipulation) that, in technological societies “has certain identical results,” whether it is used by communists or Nazis or Western democratic organizations. He regarded propaganda as sociological phenomena, not as something made or produced by people of intentions. Ellul contended that nearly all biased messages in society were propagandistic even when the biases were unconscious. He also emphasized the potency and pervasiveness of propaganda. Because propaganda is instantaneous, he contended, it destroys one’s sense of history and disallows critical reflection. Yet, Ellul believed that people need propaganda because we live in mass society. Propaganda, he said, enables us to participate in important events such as elections, celebrations, and memorials. Ellul said that truth does not separate propaganda from “moral forms” because propaganda uses truth, half-truth, and limited truth. Leonard W. Doob, who defined propaganda in 1948 as “the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time” (p. 390), said in a 1989 essay that “a clear-cut definition of propaganda is neither possible nor desirable” (p. 375). Doob rejected a contemporary definition of propaganda because of the complexity of the issues related to behavior in society and differences in times and cultures.

Both Ellul and Doob have contributed seminal ideas to the study of propaganda, but we find Ellul’s magnitude and Doob’s resistance to definitions troublesome because we believe that to analyze propaganda, one needs to be able to identify it. A definition sets forth propaganda’s characteristics and aids our recognition of it.

Psychologists Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson (2001) wrote a book about propaganda for the purpose of informing Americans about propaganda devices and psychological dynamics so that people will know “how to counteract their effectiveness” (p. xv). They regarded propaganda as the abuse of persuasion and recognized that propaganda is more than clever deception. In a series of case studies, they illustrated propaganda tactics such as withholding vital information, invoking heuristic devices, using meaningless
association, and other strategies of questionable ethics. They defined propaganda as “mass ‘suggestion’ or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual” (p. 11), thus emphasizing verbal and non-verbal communication and audience appeals.

Other scholars have emphasized the communicative qualities of propaganda. Leo Bogart (1995), in his study of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), focused on the propagandist as a sender of messages:

> Propaganda is an art requiring special talent. It is not mechanical, scientific work. Influencing attitudes requires experience, area knowledge, and instinctive “judgment of what is the best argument for the audience.” No manual can guide the propagandist. He must have “a good mind, genius, sensitivity, and knowledge of how that audience thinks and reacts.” (pp. 195–196)

(The quotations enclosed are from the original six-volume classified study of the USIA done in 1954 that Bogart’s work condenses. The study was released in abridged form in 1976, and the introduction to it was revised in 1995.)

Scholars have studied propaganda in specific institutions. Alex Carey (1997) regarded propaganda in the corporate world as “communications where the form and content is selected with the single-minded purpose of bringing some target audience to adopt attitudes and beliefs chosen in advance by the sponsors of the communications” (p. 2–1). Noam Chomsky, in his introduction to Carey’s collection of essays, said that Carey believed that “the twentieth century has been characterized by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy” (p. ix). Carey said that “commercial advertising and public relations are the forms of propaganda activity common to a democracy. . . . It is arguable that the success of business propaganda in persuading us, for so long, that we are free from propaganda is one of the most significant propaganda achievements of the twentieth century” (pp. 1–4, 2–1).

Shawn J. Parry-Giles (2002), who studied the propaganda production of the Truman and Eisenhower Cold War operations, defined propaganda as “conceived of as strategically devised messages that are disseminated to masses of people by an institution for the purpose of generating action benefiting its source” (p. xxvi). She indicated that

> Truman and Eisenhower were the first two presidents to introduce and mobilize propaganda as an official peacetime institution. In a ‘war of words,’ propaganda acted as an integral component of the government’s foreign policy
operation. To understand propaganda’s influence is to grasp the means by which America’s Cold War messages were produced and the overall impact that such strategizing had on the ideological constructions of the Cold War. (p. xvii)

Bertrand Taithe and Tim Thorton (2000) see propaganda as part of a historical tradition of pleading and convincing and therefore

as a form of political language, however, propaganda is always articulated around system of truths and expresses a logic of exclusive representation. It is the purpose of propaganda to convince, to win over and to convert; it has therefore to be convincing, viable and truthful within its own remit . . . The shaping of the term propaganda is also an indication of the way the political nation judges the manner in which political messages are communicated . . . . Propaganda promotes the ways of the community as well as defining them. (pp. 2–4)

Terence H. Qualter (1962) emphasized the necessity of audience adaptation: “Propaganda, to be effective, must be seen, remembered, understood, and acted upon . . . adapted to particular needs of the situation and the audience to which it is aimed” (p. xii). Influencing attitudes, anticipating audience reaction, adapting to the situation and audience, and being seen, remembered, understood, and acted on are important elements of the communicative process.

Pratkanis and Turner (1996) defined the function of propaganda as “attempts to move a recipient to a predetermined point of view by using simple images and slogans that truncate thought by playing on prejudices and emotions” (p. 190). They separated propaganda from persuasion according to the type of deliberation used to design messages. Persuasion, they said, is based on “debate, discussion, and careful consideration of options” to discover “better solutions for complex problems,” whereas “propaganda results in the manipulation of the mob by the elite” (p. 191). Coombs and Nimmo (1993) regarded propaganda as “an indispensable form of communication” and “a major form of public discourse;” however, they presented propaganda as “the mastery of all modern forms of palaver”—that is, “the use of guile and charm” (p. 45). Their approach is similar to Ellul’s, for they state, “The volume and sophistication of the new propaganda is so vast, and growing, that we increasingly take it for granted as natural and, thereby, we find it exceedingly difficult to distinguish what is propaganda from what is not” (p. 16). Although their major interest is political propaganda, they also focus on advertising, marketing, and sales pitches. These definitions vary from the general to the specific, sometimes including value judgments, sometimes
folding propaganda into persuasion, but nearly always recognizing propaganda as a form of communication.

Jowett and O’Donnell’s Definition of Propaganda

We seek to understand and analyze propaganda by identifying its characteristics and to place it within communication studies to examine the qualities of context, sender, intent, message, channel, audience, and response. Furthermore, we want to clarify, as much as possible, the distinction between propaganda and persuasion by examining propaganda as a subcategory of persuasion, as well as information. Our definition of propaganda focuses on the communication process—most specifically, on the purpose of the process: Propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.

Let’s examine the words of the definition to see what is precisely meant. First, \textit{deliberate} is a strong word meaning “willful, intentional, and premeditated.” It implies a sense of careful consideration of all possibilities. We use it because propaganda is carefully thought out ahead of time to select what will be the most effective strategy to promote an ideology and maintain an advantageous position. \textit{Systematic} complements \textit{deliberate} because it means “precise and methodical, carrying out something with organized regularity.” Governments and corporations establish departments or agencies specifically to create systematic propaganda. Although the general public is more aware of propaganda agencies during wartime, such agencies exist all the time, for they are essential. For example, as you will see in the case study “Premarin: A Bitter Pill to Swallow,” in Chapter 7, a pharmaceutical company, with the help of a public relations company and a massive advertising campaign, waged a campaign to both present its drug as superior and prevent other companies from getting government approval of the generic version. Advertising campaigns, as you will see in Chapter 3, are forms of systematic propaganda. Of particular interest are the advertising strategies of the pharmaceutical industries. Marcia Angell (2004a), author of \textit{The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do About It}, reveals that in the 1990 drug industry annual reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to stockholders, 36% of sales revenues went into marketing and administration. Angell said this category “includes what the industry calls ‘education,’ as well as advertising and promotion” (Angell, 2004b, p. 55). Because of the “rapacious pricing and other dubious practices of the pharmaceutical industry,” according to Angell, the
public has begun to resist and protest. As a result, she says, the “drug companies are now blanketing us with public relations messages. And the magic words, repeated over and over like an incantation, are research, innovation, and American” (Angell, 2004b, p. 52). The pharmaceutical ads that are prolific on television visually depict healthy people and their families enjoying life in the beautiful outdoors while, according to Angell, the verbal messages say something like this:

“Yes, prescription drugs are expensive, but that shows how valuable they are. Besides, our research and development costs are enormous, and we need to cover them somehow. As ‘research-based companies,’ we turn out a steady stream of innovative medicines that lengthen life, enhance its quality, and avert more expensive medical care. You are the beneficiaries of this ongoing achievement of the American free enterprise system, so be grateful, quit whining, and pay up.” (Angell, 2004b, p. 53)

However, as Angell explains, “The prices drug companies charge have little relationship to the costs of making the drugs and could be cut dramatically without coming anywhere close to threatening R&D [research and development]” (p. 54). It is not our intent to target drug companies with this example, but Angell’s research reveals that these kinds of propaganda campaigns are both deliberate and systematic.

The goal of propaganda is to “attempt,” or try, to create a certain state or states in a certain audience; thus, propaganda is an attempt at directive communication with an objective that has been established a priori. The desired state may be perceptual, cognitive, behavioral, or all three. Each one of these is described with examples as follows:

*Shaping perceptions* is usually attempted through language and images, which is why slogans, posters, symbols, and even architectural structures are developed during wartime. How we perceive is based on “complex psychological, philosophical, and practical habitual thought patterns that we carry over from past experiences” (Hayward, 1997, p. 73). *Perception* is the process of extracting information from the world outside us, as well as from within ourselves. Each individual has a perceptual field that is unique to that person and formed by the influences of values, roles, group norms, and self-image. Each of these factors colors the ways a person perceives (O’Donnell & Kable, 1982, p. 171). Johnson, in his book *In the Palaces of Memory* (1991), offered a colorful description of perception and recognition according to the activity of neural networks in the brain:

Looking out the window at the ocean, we might notice a bright light in the night sky hovering on the horizon. Deep inside the brain one neural network
responds to this vector, dismissing it as just another star. But its intense brightness causes another network to guess that it is Venus. Then the light starts getting bigger, brighter, creating a different vector, a different set of firing patterns. Another network associates this configuration with approaching headlights on a freeway. Then two more lights appear, green and red. Networks that interpret these colors feed into other networks; the pattern for *stop light* weakly responds. All over the brain, networks are talking to networks, entertaining competing hypotheses. Then comes the roar, and suddenly we know what it is. The noise vector, the growing-white-light vector, the red-and-green vector all converge on the network—or network of networks—that says *airplane*. (p. 165)

Johnson went on to say, “How a perception was ultimately categorized would depend on the architecture of the system, that which a person was born with and that which was developed through experience. Some people’s brains would tell them they had seen a UFO or an angel instead of a plane” (p. 165). Because members of a culture share similar values and norms as well as the same laws and general practices, it is quite possible to have group perceptions or, at least, very similar perceptions within a cultural group.

Our language is based on a vast web of associations that enable us to interpret, judge, and conceptualize our perceptions. Propagandists understand that our constructed meanings are related to both our past understanding of language and images and the culture and context in which they appear. Perception is dependent on our attitudes toward issues and our feelings about them. For example, legislation designed to increase timber thinning in national forests has been labeled a “Healthy Forests Initiative.” Environmental groups protested the legislation on the grounds that it was unhealthy to cut down healthy trees and harm wildlife. Michael Garrity, executive director of the Alliance for the Wild Rockies, revealed that the U.S. Forest Service will make about $312,000 by cutting 4.5 million board feet of timber in southern Montana’s Gallatin National Forest alone (“Gallatin National Forest Thinning Plan Moves Ahead,” 2005). What is “healthy” depends on our associations.

“Operation Desert Shield” was changed to “Operation Desert Storm” when U.S. forces invaded Iraq in January 1991. Changing *Shield* to *Storm* enabled people to alter their perception of the U.S. military operation from “protective” armies to “raging” forces. The second invasion of Iraq in March 2003 failed to achieve a successful slogan. “Shock and Awe” was tried, but it only lasted for 1 week. Frank Rich, editorialist for *The New York Times*, said that the television images from the Arab network Al Jazeera that depicted American soldiers who had been killed or taken prisoner by Iraqi forces contradicted the slogan. “For the first time we could
smell blood, American blood, and while that was shocking, it was far from awesome” (Rich, 2003).

The war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda had a more successful slogan with “Operation Enduring Freedom.” President George W. Bush began to use the phrase “the war on terror” shortly after the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and continuing through his reelection campaign in 2004. Gilles Kepel, in The War for Muslim Minds (2004), said, “The phrase was engineered to heighten fear while simultaneously tapping the righteous indignation of citizens in ‘civilized nations’ against barbaric murderers who would perpetrate despicable atrocities on innocent victims” (p. 112). The president, however, made a serious gaffe when, in impromptu remarks, he described America’s goal to annihilate Al Qaeda’s Taliban hosts in Afghanistan as a “crusade.” In the Muslim world, “crusade” represented medieval European Christianity’s Crusades against Islam. There was an uproar over the religious connotations of the word, which suggested that Bush wanted to conquer Islam. Bush retracted the term immediately and promptly visited a mosque in Washington, D.C., in an attempt to nullify the impression that American mobilization against Al Qaeda was aimed at Muslims or at Islam in general (Kepel, 2004, p. 117). Osama bin Laden, however, was quick to pick up the term and use it in his Al Qaeda propaganda messages denouncing American crusaders. Nevertheless, as Kepel stated, “From both a military and a psychological point of view, the Afghan operation appeared to be a triumph for the United States” (p. 120). Operation Enduring Freedom did not, however, eradicate Al Qaeda’s effectiveness because it continued its fight via the Internet Web sites, satellite television links, clandestine financial transfers, and a proliferation of activists (Kepel, 2004, p. 121).

Perceptions are also shaped by visual symbols. During the second Iraq war, as in the first, symbolic yellow ribbons have been put on trees, fences, buildings, automobiles, and jewelry to indicate support of the U.S. military. The ritual of tying yellow ribbons can be traced back to the American Civil War, when women wore yellow ribbons for their loved ones who were away at war. The 1949 John Wayne film She Wore a Yellow Ribbon reflects the theme of remembering someone who is away. For television messages about progress in the second Iraqi war, a designer who had worked for Hollywood film and television studios built a $250,000 set for General Tommy Frank’s briefings in Qatar (Rich, 2003, p. 1). President Bush, wearing combat clothing, visited troops on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln on Thanksgiving Day 2003 where, beneath a banner that said “Mission Accomplished,” he held up an artificial replica of a roasted turkey.

With digital technology, images can go out to television, newspapers, and the Internet instantly. Photographs are easily doctored, making it
difficult to tell what is real and what is not. A video of a man and his 12-year-old son, Mohammed al-Dura, cowered behind a concrete structure in the Gaza strip while Israeli soldiers and Palestinian fighters engaged in gun battle, was widely circulated in September 2000. The boy appeared to be killed and the father wounded in the crossfire. A clip of the boy’s death was widely circulated on television worldwide, and stills appeared on the front pages of newspapers. This visual became a symbol of continuing atrocities for the Palestinian intifada, causing riots to break out in the West Bank and violent outbreaks against Jews not only in Israel but also elsewhere around the world. According to an article in Reader’s Digest (“Seeing Isn’t Believing,” 2004, pp. 144–146), there were many indications that the video was staged.

As the dangerous eating disorder anorexia nervosa reaches epidemic proportions among young girls and women, hundreds of pro-anorexia Web sites keep appearing on the Internet. These Web sites, which appear to be put up by young anorexic females and friends, offer advice on dieting tips for drastic weight loss, strategies to trick parents into believing that their daughters are eating, and praise on behalf of extreme thinness. Visual propaganda on these Pro-Ana (anorexia is personified as “My friend Ana”) Web sites features photographs of famous models and movie stars that have been altered to make them appear even thinner than they actually are. Photographs of extremely obese women are also shown to trigger extreme fasting.

There is nothing new about propagandists exploiting the media to get their visual messages across, for historical propagandists did so as well in order to shape perceptions. In 1914, Mary Richardson went into the National Gallery in London and slashed a painting, The Rokeby Venus, a 1650 masterpiece by Diego Velasquéz. At her trial, she said her motive had been to draw attention to the treatment of the suffragette leader Emily Pankhurst, who was on a hunger strike in prison. Toby Clark (1997) said,

The attack on the painting would have been partly understood as an extension of the suffragettes’ tactic of smashing department store windows, which assaulted feminized spaces of consumerism like a parodic inversion of shopping. By moving the battle to the nation’s foremost art museum, Richardson brought the values of the state’s guardians of culture into the line of fire, and by choosing a famous picture of a nude woman, she targeted the point of intersection between institutional power and the representation of femininity. . . . Richardson had not destroyed the picture, but altered it, making a new image—the slashed Venus—which was widely reproduced in photographs in the national press, as Richardson had surely anticipated. Though the
newspaper’s response was hostile, demonizing “Slasher Mary” as a monstrous hysterical, Richardson had succeeded in using the mass media to disseminate “her” picture of a wounded heroine, in effect a metaphorical portrait of the martyred Pankhurst and of the suffering of women in general. (pp. 28–29)

As perceptions are shaped, cognitions may be manipulated. One way that beliefs are formed is through a person’s trust in his or her own senses (Bem, 1970). Certainly, an attitude is a cognitive or affective reaction to an idea or object, based on one’s perceptions. Of course, once a belief or an attitude is formed, a person’s perceptions are influenced by it. This does not happen in a vacuum. The formation of cognitions and attitudes is a complex process related to cultural and personal values and emotions. The Voice of America during World War II had a stated directive to manipulate the cognitions of both the enemy and America’s allies. It was to “spread the contagion of fear among our enemies but also to spread the contagion of hope, confidence and determination among our friends” (Shulman, 1997, p. 97). A study done at the University of Massachusetts during the 1991 Gulf War found that the more people watched the news of the war on television, the stronger their attitudes that the United States should be involved in the war (National Public Radio broadcast, June 26, 1991). Although it is tempting to say that the television images and patriotic messages created positive attitudes toward the war, it is possible that viewers who leaned toward support of the war watched more television. Without assigning particular causality to the media coverage or anything else, one can conclude that the first President Bush had his nation’s support. Polls taken during the war indicated very strong support of the war and of President Bush. In mid-February 1991, pollsters found 80% approval of Bush’s handling of the Gulf crisis (Ajemian, Goodgame, & Kane, 1991) and 86% approval of a ground war in Iraq (Duffey & Walsh, 1991). Contrasted with those during the Vietnam War, the government’s efforts to elicit national support for Operation Desert Storm were successful. Even people who participated in antiwar demonstrations said they supported U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. While there have been many heroes among the troops fighting in the second Iraq war, the story of Private Jessica Lynch received nonstop coverage in the media. One story in the Washington Post (April 3, 2003), whose headlines claimed, “She Was Fighting to the Death,” led us to believe that the nineteen-year-old supply clerk had fought fiercely against her Iraqi attackers but was riddled with bullet and knife wounds. As a prisoner of war, the papers said she was abused and finally rescued in a daring night raid. A revised story (June 17, 2003), with the headline “A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together,” disclosed that Lynch had not been shot or stabbed but that a Humvee accident shattered her bones. Her rifle
jammed, thus she never fired, and her captors were gone before she was rescued. As Ellen Goodman wrote in her column entitled “Jessica Lynch a Human, Not Symbolic, Hero” (June 22, 2003), “By making Jessica into a cartoon hero, we may have missed the bravery of the young soldier now recovering in Walter Reed Army Medical Center. . . . Jessica Lynch has now become a redefining story of the war, with skeptics asking whether the Pentagon spun the media or the media hyped the story” (p. B4). Whether it was the Pentagon or media hype, the public’s cognitions were manipulated. Beliefs and attitudes are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Often, the direction of a specific behavior is the intent of a propaganda effort. During war, one desired behavior is defection of enemy troops. In the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. Fourth Psychological Operations Group dropped 29 million leaflets on Iraqi forces to attract defectors. A U.S. radio program, Voice of the Gulf, featured testimonials from happy Iraqi prisoners of war, along with prayers from the Koran and the location of the bomb targets for the next day. Seventy-five percent of Iraqi defectors said they were influenced by the leaflets and the radio broadcasts (“A Psy-Ops Bonanza,” 1991). The same tactic was used in the 2003 Iraq war when leaflets that said, “Do Not Risk Your Life and the Lives of Your Comrades. Leave Now and Go Home. Watch Your Children Learn, Grow and Prosper” were dropped on Iraqi military forces. At the beginning of the 2001 war on the Taliban, U.S. military radio broadcasts into Afghanistan by Air Force EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft warned the Taliban in two of the local Afghan languages that they would be destroyed not only by U.S. bombs and missiles but also by American helicopters and ground troops:

Our helicopters will rain fire down upon your camps before you detect them on radar. . . . Our bombs are so accurate we can drop them right through your windows. Our infantry is trained for any climate and terrain on earth. United States soldiers fire with superior marksmanship and are armed with superior weapons.

This tactic to frighten the enemy was successful in directing a specific behavior, for Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem, deputy director of operations for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said “I have not seen any reports that they are returning fire on our aircraft” (“Troops Ready for Action,” 2001).

Beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are desirable end states for propagandistic purposes and determine the formation of a propaganda message, campaign, or both. Because so many factors determine the formation of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, the propagandist has to gather a great deal of information about the intended audience.
To continue with the definition, propaganda seeks to achieve a response, a specific reaction or action from an audience that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. These last words are the key to the definition of propaganda, for the one who benefits from the audience’s response, if the response is the desired one, is the propagandist and not necessarily the members of the audience. People in the audience may think the propagandist has their interest at heart, but in fact, the propagandist’s motives are selfish ones. Selfish motives are not necessarily negative, and judgment depends on which ideology one supports. For example, people who listened to the Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War found satisfaction for their hunger for information, and thus it appeared that VOA had altruistic motives. The information they received from VOA, however, was ideologically injected to shape positive perceptions about the United States and its allies and to manipulate attitudes toward democracy, capitalism, and freedom. Most Americans would not regard these practices as negative, but the communist government officials did. Later in the chapter, in the section on subpropaganda, we give examples of seemingly altruistic communication that was deliberately designed to facilitate acceptance of an ideology.

When conflict exists and security is essential, it is not unusual for propagandists to try to contain information and responses to it in a specific area. Recipients of propaganda messages are discouraged from asking about anything outside the contained area. During wartime, members of the press complain about restrictions placed on them in reporting the events of the war. Newspaper reporters covering the Civil War complained in the 1860s, as journalists did during the Gulf War in 1991. Tom Wicker (1991), of the New York Times, wrote, “The Bush administration and the military were so successful in controlling information about the war that they were able to tell the public just about what they wanted the public to know. Perhaps worse, press and public largely acquiesced in this disclosure of only selected information” (p. 96). When Iyad Allawi was selected as the interim prime minister of Iraq in August 2004, he closed down Al Jazeera’s Baghdad bureau in retaliation for unfavorable coverage (Galbraith, 2004, p. 70). Complaints regarding information control during wartime is not unusual. Consider the saying “The first casualty during war is truth.”

Although contemporary technology is capable of instantaneous transmission of messages around the world and because of the tremendous expansion of exposure to all the mass media throughout the world, it is difficult for a country to isolate its citizens from ideas and information that are commonly known in the rest of the world. Despite the availability of the Internet and the World Wide Web, China has attempted to prevent people from
receiving information. Chinese-born Tian Suning, educated in the United States, is attempting to use the Internet to inform the Chinese people about their environmental problems. He says that the Chinese government blocks access to sensitive Internet sites. “In China,” wrote Washington Post columnist Steve Mufson (1998), “information has been treated as political propaganda” (p. 7). Tian Suning, however, persists in his efforts and compares the Internet to the invention of the printing press for purposes of spreading information to the people of the world. Chinese television, considered the “mouthpiece” of government propaganda, recently has been allowed to engage in live news presentation and investigative reporting. One program, Jiaodian Fangtan (Focal Report), on CCTV tracks down and exposes problems. Chinese authorities, however, require the program to carry positive propaganda on occasions such as national holidays. The program has become very popular with the public, and its commercial success has increased government support for its investigative programs, although they are carefully managed and directed (Bin, 1999).

Television transmission crosses political boundaries as well. Certainly, as communist governments toppled in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and Romania in 1989, the world saw dramatic evidence that propaganda cannot be contained for long where television exists. People living under the austere regime of East Germany received television from West Germany and saw consumer goods that were easily had and a lifestyle that was abundant rather than austere. Also, the technology of the portable video camera enabled amateurs to capture and display footage of the Czech police on the rampage, the massacre of Georgian demonstrators in Tbilisi, and the bloodbath in Tiananmen Square. When a communist government controlled Czechoslovakia, rebellious protestors produced the “Video Journal” on home video cameras and sent it into Czech homes via rented satellite dishes. In Poland, Lech Walesa said that the underground Solidarity movement could not have succeeded without video. In Romania, while the crowds protested against Nicolae Ceausescu, the television showed fear and doubt in his eyes and encouraged people to continue to fight against his regime despite his army’s violence. Ironically, the center of the intense fighting between the army and Ceausescu’s loyalists was the Bucharest television station. For a time, the new government was in residence there, making the television station the epicenter of the revolution and the seat of the provisional government.

In this age of instantaneous television transmission, containment of information is no longer easy. Yet, propaganda itself, as a form of communication, is influenced by the technological devices for sending messages that are available in a given time. As technology advances, propagandists have more
sophisticated tools at their service. ABC’s Nightline reported in December 1991 the first recorded use of a fax machine for propaganda purposes. Leaflets describing how to prepare for a chemical warfare assault, presumably sent by the Hussein propagandists, came through thousands of Kuwaiti fax machines. The Internet and satellites are major propaganda outlets for Al Qaeda, which reaches its followers in 68 countries. Videotapes of executions of Coalition personnel in Iraq appear immediately after they occur. The elusive insurgent leader in Iraq, Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, exhorts followers to seek martyrdom in suicidal assaults against American soldiers, Christians, and Iraqi policemen through cell phone calls to his lieutenants, on Web sites, and in motivational videotapes. He has lured hundreds of followers to join him by representing Iraq as the new home of global jihad.

The study of contemporary propaganda in both oppressed and free societies is a complex endeavor. We acknowledge that one’s perception of a form of communication determines what is self-evident and what is controversial. One person’s propaganda may be another person’s education. In our definition, the elements of deliberate intent and manipulation, along with a systematic plan to achieve a purpose that is advantageous to the propagandist, however, distinguish propaganda from a free and open exchange of ideas.

Forms of Propaganda

Although propaganda takes many forms, it is almost always in some form of activated ideology. Sometimes propaganda is agitative, attempting to rouse an audience to certain ends and usually resulting in significant change; sometimes it is integrative, attempting to render an audience passive, accepting, and nonchallenging (Szanto, 1978, p. 10). Propaganda is also described as white, gray, or black, in relationship to an acknowledgment of its source and its accuracy of information.

White propaganda comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate. This is what one hears on Radio Moscow and VOA during peacetime. Although what listeners hear is reasonably close to the truth, it is presented in a manner that attempts to convince the audience that the sender is the “good guy” with the best ideas and political ideology. White propaganda attempts to build credibility with the audience, for this could have usefulness at some point in the future.

National celebrations, with their overt patriotism and regional chauvinism, can usually be classified as white propaganda. International sports competitions also inspire white propaganda from journalists. During the 1984 Summer Olympics, many complaints were voiced about “biased” coverage
by the American reporters, particularly from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The absence of the Soviet Union’s athletes in Los Angeles provoked a less than enthusiastic reaction to the multiple victories of Americans from non-American news sources. Although gold medalists of past games lauded American performances, the home countries of other athletes exclaimed “unfair.” Daley Thompson, the decathlon winner from Great Britain, appeared on television wearing a T-shirt that read, “But what about the coverage?” Coverage by the American Broadcast Corporation (ABC) was accurate reporting of the events and white propaganda. It appeared to stir up American patriotism deliberately while being genuinely excited about the American athletes’ achievements. Doubtless, this was also intended to convey a message to the Soviet government: “We do not need you at the Games.” The 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan, had all the usual nations represented, but in addition to the events themselves, American television primarily focused on biographical profiles of American athletes. It also persistently held the cameras on the American figure skater, Tara Lipinski, off the rink in many settings, whether she was shopping or watching the events. The same thing happened during the 2004 Olympics, only this time the cameras focused on the U.S. swimmer Michael Phelps, who was expected to win seven gold medals. He won six gold medals, dropping out of a race to let his teammate have a chance to win one. One has to ask whether television viewers watch the Olympics out of national pride or interest in international athletics. Greece, the host for the 2004 Olympics, concerned about poor advance ticket sales, produced white propaganda in promoting the nation as a “safe destination,” “technically excellent,” and a “modern European country.” Through opening ceremonies, speeches, and advertisements, what the Olympics 2004 home page called a “new Greek identity” emerged. Surveys given to 2001 respondents in the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and France immediately after the games in September 2004 indicated that the majority felt positive about Greece after the games based on what they saw or heard (from the home page for the 2004 Olympics [http://www.athens2004.com]).

**Black** propaganda is when the source is concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions. Black propaganda is the “big lie,” including all types of creative deceit. Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s propaganda minister, claimed that outrageous charges evoke more belief than milder statements that merely twist the truth slightly (Bogart, 1995, p. xii). During World War II, prior to Hitler’s planned invasion of Britain, a radio station known as “The New English Broadcasting Station,” supposedly run by discontented British subjects, ran half-hour programs throughout the day, opening with “Loch Lomond” and closing with “God Save the
“King.” The station’s programming consisted of “war news.” This was actually a German undercover operation determined to reduce the morale of the British people throughout the Battle of Britain.

The same technique was used on the French soldiers serving on the Maginot Line from the autumn of 1939 until the spring of 1940. Radio broadcasts originating from Stuttgart and hosted by Paul Ferdonnet, a turncoat Frenchman who pretended to be a patriot, warned the French soldiers to save France before the Nazis took it over. The French soldiers heard Ferdonnet sympathize with their discomfort in crowded and damp conditions in barrack tunnels, and they enjoyed the latest gossip about Paris. He then went on to tell them that French officers had dined at a famous restaurant in Paris, where they ate delicious six-course lunches (Roetter, 1974, p. 3). He also described British soldiers in French towns. Because they earned higher pay than their French counterparts, he said they spent a lot of money and made love to French women. He also said the French soldiers were dupes to fight England’s war and urged them to support a “new” government for France. The French soldiers were already miserable because of the conditions on the Maginot Line, and they resented the differences in pay between themselves and the British soldiers. Ferdonnet’s broadcasts, though designed to weaken the French soldiers’ morale, provided entertainment but not thoughts of defection. Perhaps the French soldiers were not deceived because they also received obvious Nazi propaganda in the form of pornographic cartoons showing British soldiers fondling naked French women. Huge billboards were set up within their view that said, “SOLDIERS OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, LICENTIOUS BRITISH SOLDIERY ARE SLEEPING WITH YOUR WIVES AND RAPING YOUR DAUGHTERS.” The French soldiers put up their own sign that said, “WE DON’T GIVE A BUGGER, WE’RE FROM THE SOUTH” (Costello, 1985, pp. 242–243). The French soldiers listened to Ferdonnet because they knew he would be more entertaining than their own official radio broadcasts (O’Donnell & Jowett, 1989, p. 51).

Radio Free Hungary made its appearance 10 years later with very successful black propaganda broadcasts. This station attracted world attention and sympathy in 1956 when the Soviets sent their tanks into Budapest to squelch the popular revolution that tried to overthrow the communist regime. Radio Free Hungary’s fervent pleas for help from the United States aroused sympathy from the Free World. The atrocities of the Soviets were described in hideous detail, and the Soviets were cursed and denounced in every transmission. The station was actually a brilliant fake operated by the KGB with the intention of embarrassing the United States. The chance that the United States would send troops to Hungary was small, even though
Radio Free Europe had suggested that Americans would support a popular uprising in Hungary. The Soviet Union used Radio Free Hungary to demonstrate that the United States could not be relied on to help a country in revolt. Radio Free Hungary was so effective that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not know it was a Soviet propaganda device until after it ceased broadcasting (Kneitel, 1982, pp. 15–16).

Even allies target friendly nations with black propaganda. British intelligence operations attempted to manipulate the United States to go to war in the 2 years before Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese. British Security Coordination (BSC) established itself in New York City’s Rockefeller Center for covert action techniques. They wrote stories that were fed to the New York Herald Tribune about Nazi spies in America and infiltrated WRUL, a radio station in New York. BSC subsidized the radio station and furnished it with material for news bulletins and specially prepared scripts for talks and commentaries. One example was a propaganda campaign by the British to deter Spain from entering the war on Germany’s side. Because the radio station had an ethics standard and a rule against broadcasting material that had not appeared in the American press, the BSC inserted its own material into friendly newspapers and then quoted it for radio broadcasts. BSC also conducted a campaign against German-controlled corporations in the United States by placing articles in newspapers and magazines, organizing protest meetings, and bringing picket lines to certain properties belonging to I. G. Farben Corporation. The British activities were discovered after the bombing of Pearl Harbor when the U.S. State Department pronounced that “British intelligence operations in America were out of control and demanded that offensive covert operations end” (Ignatius, 1989, pp. 9–11).

Black propaganda includes all types of creative deceit, and this type of propaganda gets the most attention when it is revealed. The exhibit “Fake? The Art of Deception” was featured in the British Museum in 1990 and included among the art forgeries several examples of propaganda. One type of forgery was the postage stamp (see Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3). Both British and German versions were displayed, and the exhibition catalogue reported that 160 different stamps were produced by both sides during the two world wars (M. Jones, 1990, p. 75).

The success or failure of black propaganda depends on the receiver’s willingness to accept the credibility of the source and the content of the message. Care has to be taken to place the sources and messages within a social, cultural, and political framework of the target audience. If the sender misunderstands the audience and therefore designs a message that does not fit, black propaganda may appear suspicious and tends to fail.
Gray propaganda is somewhere between white and black propaganda. The source may or may not be correctly identified, and the accuracy of the information is uncertain. In 1961, when the Bay of Pigs invasion took place in Cuba, the VOA moved over into the gray area when it denied any U.S. involvement in the CIA-backed activities. In 1966–1967, Radio Free Europe was organized, financed, and controlled by the CIA, which publicly denied any connection. A fund appeal on American television, radio, and mail indicated that Radio Free Europe was dependent on voluntary contributions, known as “truth dollars.” The actual purpose of the appeal was to fortify the deception and dispel rumors about a CIA relationship (Barnouw, 1978, p. 143). When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Radio Moscow used gray propaganda when it attempted to justify the action. The documentary Afghanistan: The Revolution Cannot Be Killed appeared on Soviet television on December 25, 1985. The program left the impression that the conflict had been instigated by outsiders, and maps with routes leading from Pakistan and Iran into Afghanistan were shown. Film clips suggested that the guerrillas were mercenaries. A captured man identified as a Turkish national said he had been sent to Afghanistan by the CIA. The film ended with music about the Afghan homeland and pro-Soviet troops being cheered by crowds (Ebon, 1987, p. 345). In each of these cases, the source of the message was correctly identified, but the information was inaccurate. Gray propaganda is also used to embarrass an enemy or competitor. Radio Moscow took advantage of the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and John F. Kennedy to derogate the United States. VOA did not miss the opportunity to offer similar commentaries about the invasion of Afghanistan or the arrests of Jewish dissidents.

Parry-Giles (1996), by reviewing internal documents of the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, revealed how the U.S. government used the domestic news media to propagandize the American public during the Cold War by giving journalists the texts to be published in the newspapers in the 1940s and 1950s. By controlling the content and favoring journalists who cooperated, the government covertly disseminated propaganda to a domestic audience. This example of gray propaganda expands the definition to include, according to Parry-Giles, the attribution of the source to a nonhostile source (p. 53). An example of gray propaganda coming from a nonhostile source is as follows. Letters describing the successes of rebuilding Iraq, presumably written by American soldiers in Iraq in 2003, appeared in newspapers across the United States. A Gannett News Service (GNS) search found identical letters in 11 newspapers, and thus they appeared to be form letters. Six soldiers, whose names appeared on the letters, were questioned by GNS, and they denied having written them. A seventh soldier did not know about the
letter bearing his name until his father congratulated him for getting it published in his hometown newspaper. All of the interviewed soldiers said they agreed with the information in the letters even though they did not write them. The actual source has not been uncovered. This is clearly gray propaganda with acceptable information attributed to a nonhostile source that was not the actual source.

Gray propaganda is not limited to governments. Companies that distort statistics on annual reports, advertising that suggests a product will achieve results that it cannot, films that are made solely for product placement, and television evangelists who personally keep the money they solicit for religious causes all tend to fall in the gray propaganda category.

Another term used to describe propaganda is disinformation. Disinformation is usually considered black propaganda because it is covert and uses

Figure 1.1 A German “black” parody of a British stamp, c. 1944. Note how the traditional crown has been replaced with a “Star of David” at the very top of the stamp.
false information. In fact, the word *disinformation* is a cognate for the Russian *dezinformatsia*, taken from the name of a division of the KGB devoted to black propaganda.

Disinformation means “false, incomplete, or misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country” (Shultz & Godson, 1984, p. 41). It is not misinformation that is merely misguided or erroneous information. Disinformation is made up of news stories deliberately designed to weaken adversaries and planted in newspapers by journalists who are actually secret agents of a foreign country. The stories are passed off as real and from credible sources. Long before the Cold War, a *New York Times* journalist successfully circulated stories that portrayed the Soviet Union in a positive light. Walter Duranty, the *Times* Moscow correspondent, was an active agent of Soviet propaganda and disinformation. He reported false stories about Josef Stalin and distorted and suppressed information. He was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for correspondence in 1932. In 1933, when Stalin conducted a savage campaign for collective farming in the Ukraine that resulted in widespread famine and more than 6 million deaths, Duranty denied the existence of the famine in his reports. He is still
on the list of Pulitzer Prize winners, but a subcommittee of the Pulitzer board is reviewing his award with the possibility of revoking it (Rutten, 2003).

Ladislav Bittmann, former deputy chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, in testimony before the House Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Congress in February 1980, said,

If somebody had at this moment the magic key that would open the Soviet bloc intelligence safes and looked into the files of secret agents operating in Western countries, he would be surprised. A relatively high percentage of secret agents are journalists. . . . There are newspapers around the world penetrated by the Communist Intelligence services. (Brownfield, 1984, p. 6)

Figure 1.3  The “battle of the stamps” continued with this British “black” parody of a German stamp. The meaning of the iconography is obvious. Here again, this stamp was probably more effective as anti-Nazi propaganda in Britain than in Germany itself.
Allan C. Brownfield (1984), reporter for the Washington Inquirer, wrote,

The documentation of the manner in which Moscow has placed false stories in the non-Communist press is massive. In one instance, Aleksey Kasnechev, the senior KGB officer in Rangoon, Burma, who defected to the U.S. in 1959, described the Soviet effort to plant such stories. His department was responsible for receiving drafts of articles from Moscow, translating them into Burmese, and then seeing that they were placed in local publications to appear as if they had been written by Burmese authors. The final step was to send copies back to Moscow. From there they were quoted in Soviet broadcasts of publications as evidence of “Burmese opinion” that favored the Communist line. (p. 6)

Among the more sensational Soviet disinformation campaigns was one that charged the United States with developing the virus responsible for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) for biological warfare. The story first appeared in the October 1985 issue of the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta, and it quoted the Patriot, a pro-Soviet newspaper in India. Although it was a Soviet tactic to place a story in a foreign newspaper to give it credibility, this time no such story had appeared in India. Despite denials by the U.S. Department of State, the story appeared in the news media of more than 60 countries, including Zimbabwe, while the nonaligned countries were having a conference there and in the October 26, 1986, issue of London’s Sunday Express after Express reporters interviewed two people from East Berlin who repeated the story. Subtle variations continued to appear in the world press, including an East German broadcast of the story into Turkey that suggested it might be wise to get rid of U.S. bases because of servicemen infected with AIDS. On March 30, 1987, Dan Rather read the following news item on CBS Evening News:

A Soviet military publication claims the virus that cause AIDS leaked from a U.S. army laboratory conducting experiments in biological warfare. The article offers no hard evidence but claims to be reporting the conclusions of unnamed scientists in the United States, Britain, and East Germany. Last October, a Soviet newspaper alleged that the AIDS virus may have been the result of Pentagon or CIA experiments. (“CBS Spreads Disinformation,” 1987, p. 7)

Increasing evidence indicates that disinformation is widely practiced by most major world powers, and this reflects the reality of international politics. For a long time, the United States denied using disinformation, yet a U.S. disinformation effort charged the Sandinistas in El Salvador with cocaine running. The Iran-Contra hearings in 1987, along with Admiral
Poindexter’s papers, however, revealed that the CIA and the Contras were involved in a massive Central American drug-smuggling connection. The CIA had conducted a complex covert anti-Sandinista guerrilla movement that was financed through the illegal sale of parts to the Iranian air force. Other disinformation stories planted by the United States during the Cold War were about carcinogenic Soviet spy dust, Soviet sponsorship of international terrorism, and attempts by Bulgarians to assassinate the pope (Alexandre, 1988, pp. 114–115). The CIA began covert work in Afghanistan as early as 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded (Coll, 2004). According to Ahmed Rashid (2004), the Pakistan, Afghanistan, and central Asia correspondent for the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and the *Daily Telegraph*, “The CIA has a long record of manipulating the press and television and putting out its own interpretation of events” (p. 19).

As a communication process, disinformation is described according to two models we have developed (see Figures 1.4 and 1.5). In Figure 1.4, the propagandist (P) creates a *deflective source* ($P_1$), which becomes the apparent source of the message (M). The receiver (R) perceives the information as coming directly from $P_1$ and does not associate it with the original propagandist (P). In Figure 1.4, the propagandist secretly places the original message ($M_1$) in a *legitimating source* ($P_2$). This message (now $M_2$), as interpreted by $P_2$, is then picked up by the propagandist (P) and communicated to the receiver (R) in the form $M_3$, as having come from $P_2$. This legitimates the message and at the same time dissociates the propagandist (P) from its origination. One can see in both models that the propagandist’s intent is to obscure the identity of the message originator, thus creating a high degree of credibility for both message and apparent source.
Propaganda thus runs the gamut from truth to deception. It is, at the same time, always value and ideology laden. The means may vary from a mild slanting of information to outright deception, but the ends are always predetermined to favor the propagandist.

Subpropaganda/Facilitative Communication

Another dimension of propaganda is what Doob (1948) called “subpropaganda.” Here, the propagandist’s task is to spread an unfamiliar doctrine, for which a considerable period of time is needed to build a frame of mind in the audience toward acceptance of the doctrine. To gain the target audience’s favor, various stimuli are used to arouse the attention of the audience and the related encoders and agents who mediate communication. L. John Martin (1971), a research administrator in the USIA for 9 years, called subpropaganda “facilitative communication” (p. 62)—that is, an activity designed to keep lines open and maintain contacts against the day when they will be needed for propaganda purposes.

Facilitative communication most frequently takes the form of financial aid, radio newscasts, press releases, books, pamphlets, periodicals, cultural programs, exhibits, films, seminars, language classes, reference services, and personal social contacts. These are all arranged in an effort to create a friendly atmosphere toward those who may be needed later. W. Phillips Davison (1971) gave examples of influencing journalists to give favorable press to the United States by offering rides and other services such as office
space provided by the U.S. Committee on Public Information, parties, conducted tours of foreign cities, and news scoops.

Facilitative communication itself may not be propaganda, but it is communication designed to render a positive attitude toward a potential propagandist. In 1969, 450 active registrations of agencies distributing propaganda were on file with the U.S. government on behalf of foreign agencies. Davison pointed out that most were concerned with tourism, investment, or trade. This did not include activities by embassies or consulates, nor did it include mail and shortwave radio from abroad. Bogart (1995) said that within the USIA, both in 1953 and today,

It is widely believed that a sense of affinity is developed by showing the people of other nations American documentary films and giving them free access to American books and publications. Such exposure fosters friendship that has great, intangible value, quite apart from any immediate political benefits. An even more powerful impression is made by bringing foreign nationals to the United States, where they can meet Americans and get a first-hand look at the society. (p. xxxiii)

In 1998, the USIA maintained more than 200 posts in 143 countries “to explain and support American foreign policy and promote U.S. national interests” (www.usia.gov/abtusia/factsh.htm, 1998). This agency alone published magazines and commercial bulletins in 20 languages, had a wireless file information service in 5 languages, produced films, operated a radioteletype network, maintained a World Wide Web site, supported a speaker program abroad, supported public-access libraries, sponsored exchange and visitor programs, and broadcasts more than 900 hours a week through VOA in 47 languages, including English. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcasts more than 500 hours a week in 23 languages. VOA “WORLD-NET” is a satellite television network established in 1983. News, educational, and cultural programs are broadcast 24 hours a day to millions of viewers through American embassies, U.S. Information Services (USIS) posts, and foreign television and cable networks. The USIA was moved back into the State Department during the Clinton administration and became known as the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP). President Clinton called the propaganda from the bureau one of “the most effective foreign policy tools we have” (Parry-Giles, 2002, p. 191). Under the George W. Bush administration, the IIP is “the principal international strategic communications entity for the foreign affairs community” (http://www.state.gov/r/iip/). Its mission statement is to “inform, engage, and influence international audiences about U.S. policy and society to advance America’s interests.” The
outreach is for international audiences, including media, government, opinion leaders, and the public in more than 140 countries around world. The bureau produces news articles; electronic and print publications; products on U.S. values, culture, and daily life in America; and lectures, workshops, and seminars to promote understanding of U.S. policies. President Bush’s weekly radio addresses as well as all electronic and print articles are available in 7 languages—English, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, French, Russian, and Persian (see http://usinfo.state.gov).

Another form of facilitative propaganda is helping societies restore their institutions after war or conflict. American soldiers in Afghanistan have been rebuilding schools in Paktia with the objective of winning enough gratitude and loyalty from the local Afghans to undercut any support for the defeated Taliban movement (Constable, 2002, p. 15).

The use of propaganda is prevalent in the world today. It is not only obvious in war-torn countries, divisions between and among ethnic groups, and struggles for power, but dissemination of propaganda is easier than it has ever been. Communication networks have expanded and changed, and information tends to be more accessible. The institutions of modern society, government, business, and religion retain the need to manipulate responses deliberately.

A Model of Propaganda

The literature of propaganda often refers to “mass persuasion,” suggesting that propaganda is persuasion on a one-to-many basis. Propaganda tends to be linked with a general societal process, whereas persuasion is regarded as an individual psychological process. Propaganda has not been altogether successfully differentiated from persuasion by other writers. The model in Figure 1.6 is our attempt to differentiate between them and to demonstrate a separation according to purpose and process. The model also reveals the similarity between persuasion and propaganda, with subtle differences of technique used according to purpose.

Communication Defined

Communication is a process in which a sender transmits a message to a receiver through a channel. This process has been represented by both linear and transactional models. One of the earliest models of communication was developed by Aristotle (333 B.C.E.), who described a speaker, a speech, and an audience as the major components of the communication act. A linear model that influenced communication research was developed by Shannon...
and Weaver in 1949 for the study of electronic engineering. Its components were source, message, transmitter, signal, and receiver. Other linear communication models that followed were similar to Shannon and Weaver’s because they emphasized source, message, channel, and response.

Communication involves attempts to share meaning through a process of symbolic interaction between and among human beings. Communication has been defined as “an essential life process of exchange through which humans create, acquire, transmit, and utilize information” (O’Donnell, 1993, p. 8). Communication is built around an exchange of information that has both intended and perceived meaning. Information exchange can reduce uncertainty after several cycles of exchange. The tendency is for the sender and the receiver to move toward one point, for one to move toward the other, or for both to unite in a common interest or focus.

A straightforward definition of the communication process is that which happens when A (sender) communicates to B (receiver) about X (Westley & MacLean, 1977). A may be a person, a group, or a social system. B may be a person, a group, or a social system as well. Communication is often a human face-to-face transaction, but it is also often a mediated interaction whereby A communicates to B through C about X. Here, C is a gatekeeper, an encoder of a message, or quite possibly an agent for B (Westley & MacLean, 1977).

It is important to examine both the message and the response to it in the study of communication. Responses may be in the realm of feedback, or they

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**Figure 1.6** The Jowett/O’Donnell purpose model of propaganda

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may be examined as effects on the audience. The elements of face-to-face or mediated communication or both must be examined in the light of the context in which they occur, both in a specific and an immediate sense and in the social-cultural framework of the times.

Propaganda and Information

Communication has been defined as a process of exchange in which sender and receiver, either through mediated or nonmediated means, create, acquire, transmit, and use information. When the information is used to accomplish a purpose of sharing, explaining, or instructing, this is considered to be informative communication. People seek information when they need to understand their world. Once gained, information tends to reduce uncertainty. Uncertainty reduction is usually acquired through the communication of messages; thus, messages can be analyzed in terms of the amount of uncertainty they remove. Informative messages affect receivers by allowing them to acquire information, understand their world, and learn.

Generally, informative communication is thought to be neutral because it is characterized by a very special and limited use of language. Informative discourse is communication about subject matter that has attained the privileged status of being beyond dispute. Whenever information is regarded as disputable by either the sender or the receiver, the communication has difficulty proceeding as information. An informative communicator differs from other kinds of communicators by having the purpose of creating mutual understanding of data that are considered to be accurate, concepts that are considered to be indisputable, and ideas that are based on facts.

Propaganda uses informative communication in a similar fashion. The difference is that the purpose exceeds the notion of mutual understanding. The purpose of propaganda is to promote a partisan or competitive cause in the best interest of the propagandist but not necessarily in the best interest of the recipient. The recipient, however, may believe that the communication is merely informative. As we pointed out in the example of VOA, white propaganda is very similar to informative communication. Information is imparted from an identifiable source, and the information is accurate. The distinction between white propaganda and informative communication is that white propaganda informs solely to promote a specific ideology. Techniques of informative communication are also used in gray and black propaganda, but the information is not likely to be accurate or even based in reality. The propaganda bureau of Nazi Germany was known as the “Ministry of Information,” an excellent example of black propaganda parading as information.
Many writers grapple with the distinction between propaganda and informative communication in educational practices that include the communicative purpose of instructing for mutual understanding. Elliot Aronson (1980, p. 60) questioned whether educators are merely imparting knowledge or skill. One subject area that Aronson questioned is arithmetic. He pointed out that most examples in elementary school arithmetic texts deal with buying, selling, renting, working for wages, and computing interest. He also cited Zimbardo, Ebbeson, and Maslach (1977), who thought these examples did more than simply reflect the capitalist system in which education occurs. The point is that arithmetic problems with a capitalist ideological base endorse the system, legitimate it, and suggest that it is the natural and normal way. Aronson said that interpretation of an instructional practice depends largely on the values of the person interpreting it. Four authors were asked by university researchers if their management textbooks are propaganda. Although their responses varied, “all four authors [said that they] write their textbooks to support a managerial ideology.” The researchers concluded that the managerial ideology “would seem to serve the interest of other groups who are also currently most powerful in management education” (Cameron, Ireland, Lussier, New, & Robbins, 2003, pp. 726–728). (William E. Griffith, in his essay on communist propaganda, referred to propaganda and education interchangeably. He said that educating the masses has been the same as propaganda [cited in Lasswell, Lerner, & Speier, 1980, pp. 239–258].)

By evaluating educational practices according to their ends rather than their means, however, one can observe the use of informative communication as a means of achieving a propagandistic end in practices such as the ones described above.

**Propaganda and Persuasion**

**Persuasion Defined**

_Persuasion_ as a subset of communication is usually defined as a communicative process to influence others. A persuasive message has a point of view or desired behavior for the recipient to adopt in a voluntary fashion. Victoria O'Donnell and June Kable (1982) defined persuasion as

a complex, continuing, interactive process in which a sender and a receiver are linked by symbols, verbal and nonverbal, through which the persuader attempts to influence the persuadee to adopt a change in a given attitude or behavior because the persuadee has had perceptions enlarged or changed. (p. 9)
Persuasion has the effect, when it is successful, of resulting in a reaction such as “I never saw it that way before.” What happens is that the recipient of the persuasive interaction relates to, or contrasts the message with, his or her existing repertoire of information, experiences, or both. The process of persuasion is an interactive one in which the recipient foresees the fulfillment of a personal or societal need or desire if the persuasive purpose is adopted. The persuader also has a need fulfilled if the persuadee accepts the persuasive purpose. Because both persuader and persuadee stand to have their needs fulfilled, persuasion is regarded as more mutually satisfying than propaganda.

Persuasion Is Transactional

People respond to persuasion that promises to help them in some way by satisfying their wants or needs. That is why the persuader must think in terms of the persuadee’s needs, as well as his or her own. Persuasion is a reciprocal process in which both parties are dependent on one another. It is a situation of interactive or transactive dependency. Interactive suggests turn taking, whereas transactive suggests a more continuous and dynamic process of co-creating meaning. The persuader who understands that persuasion is interactive or a transaction in which both parties approach a message-event and use it to attempt to fulfill needs will never assume a passive audience. An active audience seeks to have its needs fulfilled by the persuader, and an active persuader knows how to appeal to audience needs in order to ask the audience to fill his or her needs by adopting the message-purpose. A politician seeking votes must address the needs of the voters. If the voters are convinced that the politician will fulfill their needs, then they will fulfill the needs of the politician by casting positive votes at election time.

Responses to Persuasion

Persuasion attempts to evoke a specific change in the attitudes or behaviors of an audience. The change sought is a specific response from the audience. Three different forms of response are possible (Roloff & Miller, 1980, p. 16).

First is response shaping. This is similar to learning, wherein the persuader is a teacher and the audience is a student. A persuader may attempt to shape the response of an audience by teaching it how to behave and offer positive reinforcement for learning. If audience responses favorable to the persuader’s purpose are reinforced by rewards to the audience, positive attitudes are developed toward what is learned. The audience has a need for
positive reinforcement filled, and the persuader has a need for a desired response from the audience filled.

Second is response reinforcing. If the people in the audience already have positive attitudes toward a subject, the persuader reminds them about the positive attitudes and stimulates them to feel even more strongly by demonstrating their attitudes through specified forms of behavior. Much persuasion in today’s society is response reinforcing (e.g., blood drives, fund-raising, pep rallies, helping others), but people have to be motivated to go out and do these things year after year. Very little controversy surrounds these situations, but people’s emotional needs have to be aroused to get them to get out and give blood or money or team support and other activities requiring effort, time, and money.

Third is response changing. This is the most difficult kind of persuasion because it involves asking people to switch from one attitude to another (“Favor the flat tax”), to go from a neutral position to a positive or negative one (“Support the community’s recycling program”), to change behavior (“Practice safe sex”), or to adopt a new behavior (“Host an international student for the summer”). People are reluctant to change; thus, to convince them to do so, the persuader has to relate the change to something in which the persuadee already believes. This is called an anchor because it is already accepted by the persuadee and will be used to tie down new attitudes or behaviors. An anchor is a starting point for change because it represents something already widely accepted by potential persuadees. Anchors can be beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, and group norms. In 1943, during World War II, the illustrator Norman Rockwell used the anchors of the four freedoms declared by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom to worship, and freedom of speech) in posters to get people to buy savings bonds. The freedom of speech poster proclaimed “Save freedom of speech, buy war bonds” (see Figure 1.7).

Beliefs

A belief is a perceived link between any two aspects of a person’s world (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 131). A belief expresses a relationship between two things (“I believe that a laptop computer will help me get better grades”) or a thing and a characteristic of that thing (“I believe that life once existed on Mars”). We have thousands of beliefs. To change old beliefs or to create new ones, a persuader has to build on beliefs that already exist in the minds of the audience. A persuader has to use anchors of belief to create new belief. The stronger the belief of a receiver, the more likely it is to influence the formation of a new belief.
Values

A value is a special kind of belief that endures and is not likely to change. A value is a belief that is prescriptive and a guideline for a person’s behavior. A value can be a standard for behavior (honesty, sensitivity) or a desired end (success, power). Values are concepts of right and wrong, good
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, p. 551), after a review of the literature on values, designated five features that are common to most definitions of values: (a) concepts or beliefs (b) about desirable end states or behaviors (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior or events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance.

Personal values are derived from cultural values that tend to be utopian, mythic, and pragmatic. For example, many people share a national vision that embraces the belief in popular participation of people in government, in the right to say what you think without restriction, and in good conquering evil. A West European research organization, Futuribles, through a grant from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), conducted a study of 1,125 experts throughout the world to predict their countries’ core values for the year 2000. The experts from North America, primarily the United States, predicted that the top-ranked values would include possession of material wealth, health, jobs and work, individual liberty, and social equality. In contrast, the experts from Latin American countries predicted survival as the top priority, whereas African experts feared the loss of liberty. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) surveyed subjects from Israel and Germany and found seven dominant motivational values: enjoyment, achievement, restrictive conformity, security, prosocial (active concern for the welfare of others), maturity, and self-direction.

When situations arise that pose a conflict between national and personal values, people often find it difficult to adapt. A nation’s decision to go to war to protect economic assets creates conflict for the people whose children may die in battle. People regard their values as very personal and get quite upset when these are attacked; thus, the values make strong anchors for both persuasion and propaganda.

Attitudes

An attitude is a readiness to respond to an idea, an object, or a course of action. It is an internal state of feeling toward, or an evaluative response to, an idea, person, or object. It is expressed in a statement that clarifies a position (“I like milk in my coffee” or “I disagree with political correctness codes”). An attitude is a relatively enduring predisposition to respond; therefore, it already resides in the minds of audience members and can be used as an anchor. As people form beliefs about an object, idea, or person, they automatically and simultaneously acquire attitudes toward it. Whereas each belief is an association of an attribute with an object, an attitude is essentially an attribute evaluation.
Attitude change is often the desired response in persuasion; thus, attitudes may be used as anchors ("If you prefer to be physically fit, then you should exercise regularly") or as persuasive end states ("Patients should be allowed to sue health maintenance organizations"). People have thousands of attitudes—some important, others inconsequential. A persuader and a propagandist can use strongly held attitudes as anchors to promote related attitude change.

Behavior

Behavior can be used as an anchor not only because it is an overt expression of a way of being but also because behavioral patterns are fair predictors of future behaviors. When a behavior is recurrent, a script for behavior develops to the point that a great deal of consciousness is not necessary to continue the same behavior. References to successful behavior can be motivational. By reminding persuadees that their behavior has meant need fulfillment in the past, a persuader can urge them to use the same or similar behavior in the future. Conversely, if a certain behavior has negative consequences, the persuader can urge persuadees to avoid the consequences by discontinuing the behavior.

Another successful motivational strategy is to show persuadees models of behavior. Modeling influences new behavior in persuadees because it offers new information about how to behave (Bandura, 1986). Albert Bandura’s model of observational learning includes the necessity of symbolic representation in words and images for retention of a behavior and identification of the subject with the model. Powerful modeling can simultaneously change observers’ behaviors, thought patterns, emotional reactions, and evaluations. Observational learning includes knowledge of the rules of thought, as well as behavior itself.

Group Norms

Group norms are beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors derived from membership in groups. Group norms can be used as anchors because people have a tendency to conform to the norms of the groups to which they belong. Psychologist Daryl Bem (1970, p. 75) said that the major influence on people is people. Peer pressure influences how people dress, talk, and behave. When they are uncertain about what position to take or what to do, people often adopt the attitudes and behaviors of their peers. They also succumb to peer pressure because it is easier to conform than to depart from the norms of their groups.
Another form of group norm is derived from the norms of a reference group. Reference groups are groups admired or disliked by nonmembers who may be influenced in a positive or negative direction by those groups. People may admire the norms of a group such as Amnesty International or be repulsed by the norms of the Skinheads.

Resonance

A persuader who is well prepared knows the audience. Anchors can be discovered from knowledge of the audience members’ affiliation with groups as well as from insight into their beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors. Because these categories constitute important attributes of the audience, they can be used to motivate the audience to accept the purpose of the persuader. Both persuasion and propaganda tend to produce messages of resonance; that is, the recipients do not perceive the themes of messages to be imposed on them from an outside authority to which they are required or committed to defer. Rather, the recipients perceive the anchors on which the message is based as coming from within themselves. Paul Kecskemeti (1973) defined the propagandist’s ideal role in relation to the recipient of the message as that of an alter ego: “Someone giving expression to the recipient’s own concerns, tensions, aspirations, and hopes. . . . Thus, propaganda . . . denies all distance between the source and the audience: the propaganda voices the propagandee’s own feelings” (p. 864). Nazi propaganda relied on resonance by representing legends of the past, familiar music, and street theater in its propaganda. There was a bizarre play performed for German railroad workers in 1933. Hitler was compared to Jesus Christ in a Christmas nativity play. The performers, dressed as crusaders, acted out the struggle of light and darkness while Stormtroopers marched to the nativity scene carrying swastika flags. An announcer spoke over a loudspeaker: “God sent us a savior at the moment of our deepest despair; our Fuhrer and our wonderful Stormtroopers” (T. Clark, 1997, p. 52).

Identification must take place between the persuader and the persuadee in persuasive communication. Common sensations, concepts, images, and ideas that make them feel as one are shared. A persuader analyzes an audience to be able to express its members’ needs, desires, personal and social beliefs, attitudes, and values, as well as their attitudes and concerns about the social outcome of the persuasive situation. The persuader is a voice from without, speaking the language of the audience members’ voices within. Yet, persuasive communication may be dialectic in nature and preclude homogeneity. Conversely, the propaganda message is more often homogeneous because it is more likely to be sent to a mass audience than to one person in
an interpersonal setting. Exceptions to this exist, of course, when the propagandist works one-on-one with various subjects.

Persuasion Seeks Voluntary Change

In general, practitioners of persuasion assume that the audience has access to information about the other side of a controversial issue as well as exposure to counterpersuasion. In other words, there is a recognition that any change that occurs within audience perceptions, cognitions, or behaviors will be voluntary change. Both parties, persuader and persuadee, will perceive the change due to persuasion as mutually beneficial.

Misleading and Manipulating an Audience

Of course, a persuader can mislead an audience regarding the true intention. Sometimes an audience is aware of this, which gives an aura of voluntary compliance; that is, the audience can decide to consent to change while knowing quite well that the persuader has a hidden agenda. Sometimes an audience will believe a persuader’s spoken intent, and consequently, it will be manipulated and used without knowing what is happening. This we regard as propaganda. More commonly, however, the propagandist exploits an audience’s beliefs or values or group norms in such a way as to fan the fires of prejudice or self-interest. When the audience goes along with such practices, a certain kind of mutual reciprocity occurs because both parties have needs fulfilled. The audience’s needs—the reinforcement of prejudicial or self-serving attitudes—get fulfilled and spoken, but the persuader’s needs—the attainment of a selfish end through the audience’s compliance—get fulfilled but not spoken. A 1993 Roper poll revealed that 22% of U.S. adults and 20% of U.S. high school students believed it was possible that the Holocaust did not happen. Deborah Lipstadt (1993) attributed this to partial ignorance on the part of those surveyed but also recognized that Holocaust denial stems from “a mélange of extremist, racist, and nativist sentiments” (p. 4).

In contrast, no audience members, no matter how perverse their own needs, will put up with hearing that they are being manipulated and used to fulfill another’s selfish needs. Thus, the propagandist cannot reveal the true intent of the message.

Rhetorical Background and the Ethics of Persuasion

Since the beginnings of the study of rhetoric, which was synonymous with persuasion until the early 20th century, theorists and practitioners have
been concerned with ethics. The form of government in ancient Greece encouraged public speaking. Citizens voiced their opinions openly and were encouraged to share in making political and judicial decisions. Because civic responsibility was presumed, encouragement to be honorable citizens and to acquire skill in public statement was strong. The Athenian system disqualified any speaker who was “suspected of certain dishonorable acts . . . he could be prosecuted, not for the offense, but for continuing to speak in the assembly after committing the offense” (Bonner, 1933, p. 80). People studied the art of rhetoric almost as an entire system of higher education, if not a way of life (Hunt, 1925, p. 3).

Plato opposed the place of rhetoric in Athenian life as well as whatever part rhetoric had in influencing public opinion. As Hunt (1925) said, “He despised mere opinion almost as much as he did the public” (p. 3). He believed in a government ruled by philosopher-kings and not a government in which rhetoric was employed by those who did not possess true wisdom or knowledge. As a result, two of his writings, the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*, attacked rhetoric as a system capable of making the worse appear the better reason. In the *Gorgias*, Plato criticized the study of rhetoric for misleading people into believing that, by attempting through words to achieve what is good, they could do good. Without insight and wisdom, a person who studied rhetoric was likely to become what we would call a propagandist. Plato, through his spokesman Socrates, posed the following questions:

Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to what is best, aiming at this, that the citizens may be made as good as possible by their discourses? or do they, too, endeavor to gratify the citizens, and neglecting the public interest for the sake of their own private advantage, do they treat the people as children, trying only to gratify them, without being in the least concerned whether they shall become better or worse by these means? (cited in Cary, 1854, pp. 125–126)

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato admonishes the rhetorician to have high moral purpose and knowledge of truth or else not attempt rhetoric at all. Through the exhibition of three speeches about love, which represent three different kinds of speakers, Plato contrasted the neutral, the evil, and the noble lovers/speakers. The second lover/speaker is evil and insincere and attempts to exploit, deceive, and manipulate his audience, whereas the third lover/speaker is noble and has a genuine desire to help the audience and to actualize its ideals. Plato summed up the best of the speakers by having Socrates say,

A man must know the truth about each particular of which he speaks or writes. . . . Not till then can discourses be artistic as far as it lies in the nature
Aristotle, the great philosopher and social interpreter of fourth-century Greece, produced many classical works about the nature of ideas and people. The work that is seminal in the field of persuasion is *Rhetoric* (L. Cooper, 1932). Although Aristotle studied with Plato at the academy and embraced many ideas that Plato expressed in the *Phaedrus*, *Rhetoric* tends to be detached from issues of morality. Rather, it is an amoral and scientific analysis of *rhetoric*, defined as “the faculty of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion” (L. Cooper, 1932, p. 7). Yet, in *Rhetoric*, Aristotle establishes the concept of *credibility* (*ethos*) as a form of proof and mode of persuasion. *Ethos*, an artistic proof established within the discourse itself, provides the audience with insight into the persuader’s character, integrity, and goodwill. Other forms of proof are emotional appeal (*pathos*) and the speech itself, its reasoning and arguments (*logos*), defined by Aristotle as “when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth from such means of persuasion as are appropriate to a particular subject” (cited in L. Cooper, 1932, p. 9).

Central to the study of rhetoric is the audience, which Aristotle classified and analyzed. Logic is established through audience participation in an interactive reasoning process. Known as the *enthymeme*, this practical device is regarded by many as a syllogism with some part or parts missing. In fact, the enthymeme enabled the persuader and persuadees to co-create reasoning by dialectically coming to a conclusion. It requires the audience mentally to fill in parts of the reasoning process, thus stimulating involvement. Aristotle regarded the enthymeme as a way of guarding truth and justice against falsehood and wrong. He believed that audiences could not follow close and careful logical reasoning related to universal truths but could participate in reasoning related to probability in the sphere of human affairs. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle dealt with his expectations for high moral principles and analyzed virtue and vice to provide strategies for *ethos*, or character of the speaker. With regard to persuasion, he indicated that a crafty person could artfully manipulate the instruments of rhetoric for either honest or dishonest ends. Depending on which end is desired, the use of rhetorical devices is judged accordingly: “If . . . the aim be good, the cleverness is praiseworthy; but if it be bad, it becomes craft” (cited in Browne, 1850, VI, pp. xii, 8). MacCunn (1906) interpreted this to mean that the Aristotelian thesis postulates that “cleverness and character must strike alliance” (p. 298). MacCunn also saw Aristotle’s general point of view as judging the means according to the ends sought: “He who would win the harper’s
skill must win by harping; he who would write, by writing; he who would heal the sick by healing them. In these, as indeed in all the arts, faculty is begotten of function, and definite proclivity comes of determinate acts” (p. 301). Aristotle believed that the ethics of rhetoric could be judged by the speaker’s intent, the means used in the speech to further the argument, and accompanying circumstances. He also thought the integration of reason and emotional appeals was acceptable as long as the speaker advocated for the general public good.

Quintilian, the premier teacher of imperial rhetoric in Rome during the first century C.E., wrote the *Institutes of Oratory*, in which he advocated the necessity of credibility, arguing on behalf of Cato’s definition: “An orator is a good man, skilled in speaking” (cited in Benson & Prosser, 1969, p. 118). This concept was reiterated by St. Augustine in his fifth-century work on Christian preaching and rhetoric, *On Christian Doctrine*. Insistence on truth as the overall objective of public speaking is the cardinal tenet of this treatise. St. Augustine was concerned about using rhetorical techniques for false persuasion, but he thought the way it was used did not reflect on rhetoric itself:

There are also rules for a more copious kind of argument, which is called eloquence, and these rules are not the less true that they can be used for persuading men of what is false, but as they can be used to enforce the truth as well, it is not the faculty itself that is to be blamed, but the perversity of those who put it to a bad use. (cited in J. F. Shaw, 1873, IX, p. 5)

Classical concepts of rhetoric, especially that of the good man speaking well, were revitalized throughout the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. Neoclassicism held forth in theoretical works on persuasion despite the appearance of despotic princes and authoritarian rulers in the same countries in which the rhetorical works were published. In 1513, Machiavelli wrote *The Prince*, advocating that deception to gain and maintain control be used, that the ends justified the means, and that the public was easily corrupted. He said, however, that force was needed to coerce the public as well:

The populace is by nature fickle; it is easy to persuade them of something, but difficult to confirm them in that persuasion. Therefore one must urgently arrange matters so that when they no longer believe they can be made to believe by force. (Machiavelli, 1513/1961, p. 19)

Machiavelli accurately described the demagogue/propagandist—“everyone sees who you appear to be, few sense who you really are”—and elaborated thusly:
A prince, therefore, need not necessarily have all the good qualities I mentioned above, but he should certainly appear to have them. . . . He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, kind, guileless, and devout. . . . But his disposition should be such that, if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how. (pp. 55–56)

In the same century, rhetorical theorists such as Philipp Melanchthon, the humanist educator, contemporary of Martin Luther, and major religious reformer of Germany; Leonard Cox, the first to write a treatise on rhetoric in the English language; and Thomas Wilson, Elizabeth I's secretary of state, whose Arte of Rhetorique was published eight times in 30 years from 1553 to 1583, were turning out works that echoed the ethical principles of Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian.

Even after the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide became an official organ of the Roman Catholic Church in 1622, no rhetorical theorist addressed its implications with regard to persuasion. The major rhetorical works of the 17th century were Francis Bacon’s four treatises—adapting classical rhetoric to the needs of the scientist and affirming the value of ornamentation and imaginative coloring in rhetoric—and the early elocutionists Robert Robinson and John Bulwer, whose works on delivery foreshadowed the rhetorical movement that placed major emphasis on delivery and pronunciation.

Rhetoric and Propaganda

The study of persuasion in the theories of rhetoric laid down throughout the centuries emphasized adherence to the truth and sound reason in revealing the real intent of the persuader, demonstration of a conclusion based on evidence and reasoning, and a sincere concern for the welfare of the audience. These are the humanistic concerns of the classicists. It can be argued that the humanists were concerned with eloquence and consequently preferred rhetoric to logic. No major rhetorical theories have come from nations whose governments have been totalitarian; thus, the history of rhetoric hardly includes the study of propaganda except for allusions to misuse of rhetorical techniques for dishonest ends. The Bolsheviks had Eisenstein to describe and demonstrate the use of propaganda in film, and the Nazis had Hitler’s Mein Kampf and Goebbels’s diaries as guidelines for propaganda, but these have not been part of the history of rhetorical theory. The reason for this comes from the rhetorician’s insistence on a consideration of ethics in rhetoric. Not until Kenneth Burke, the American literary critic, wrote
“The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’” in 1939 (in Burke, 1973) did a serious rhetorical critic tackle and analyze propaganda while simultaneously contributing new ideas to rhetorical theory.

Drawing on what he called the Dramatistic Pentad—five interrelated motivational or causal points of view—Burke (1941/1973) analyzed the act (what took place in thought or deed), the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred), the agent (the actor or person or institution that performed the act), the agency or agencies (the means or instruments used by the agent), and the purpose (the motive or cause behind the act). Burke determined that, in Mein Kampf, (a) the act was the bastardization of religious thought; (b) the scene was discordant elements in a culture progressively weakened by capitalist materialism; (c) the agent was Hitler; (d) the agencies were unity identification such as “one voice” (the Reich, Munich, the army, German democracy, race, nation, Aryan, heroism, etc.) versus disunity identification such as images, ideas, and so on of the parliamentary wrangle of the Hapsburgs, Babel of opinion, and Jewish cunning, together with spiritualization and materialization techniques; and (e) the purpose was the unification of the German people. Burke’s description of Hitler’s strategies to control the German people is a masterful criticism of propaganda, yet it also is heavily flavored with moralistic judgment. It warns the reader about “what to guard against if we are to forestall the concocting of similar medicine in America” (p. 191).

Donald C. Bryant’s (1953) seminal essay, “Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope,” devotes a few pages to propaganda, which includes advertising and certain political discourse, as “partial, incomplete, and perhaps misused, rhetorics” (p. 413). He characterized propaganda by technique—excluding competing ideas, short-circuiting informed judgment, ignoring alternative ideas or courses of action, and in general subverting rational processes. Although Bryant did not engage in propaganda analysis or add new insight into understanding propaganda, he acknowledged that the understanding of propaganda is grounded in the understanding of rhetoric. His stance is a classical one, for he said, “The major techniques of this propaganda are long known rhetorical techniques gone wrong” (p. 415).

Although few rhetorical theorists discussed propaganda, the study of persuasion blossomed in the 20th century as an inquiry into behaviorism. This happened almost concurrently with the serious study of propaganda by social scientists. This development and synopsis of the resulting research is presented in Chapter 4. Now let’s return to the model that depicts propaganda as a special form of communication.
Propaganda as a Form of Communication

Propaganda may appear to be informative communication when ideas are shared, something is explained, or instruction takes place. Information communicated by the propagandist may appear to be indisputable and totally factual. The propagandist knows, however, that the purpose is not to promote mutual understanding but rather to promote his or her own objectives. Thus, the propagandist will attempt to control information flow and manage a certain public’s opinion by shaping perceptions through strategies of informative communication.

A persuader, likewise, shares ideas, explains, or instructs within the purpose of promoting the mutual satisfaction of needs. In fact, a persuader skillfully uses evidence to teach potential persuadees with the intent of response shaping. Evidence itself does not persuade, but it can enhance a persuader’s credibility (McCroskey, 1969). Persuaders, however, do not try to appear as informers. An effective persuader makes the purpose as clear as possible in order to bring about attitude or behavior change. The explicitly stated conclusion is twice as likely to get the desired audience response compared with the suggested one (Biddle, 1966; Hovland & Mandell, 1952). The propagandist may appear to have a clear purpose and certainly an explicitly stated conclusion, but the true purpose is likely to be concealed.

Concealed Purpose

The propagandist is very likely to appear as a persuader with a stated purpose that seems to satisfy mutual needs. In reality, however, the propagandist wants to promote his or her own interests or those of an organization—sometimes at the expense of the recipients, sometimes not. The point is that the propagandist does not regard the well-being of the audience as a primary concern. The propagandist is likely to be detached from the recipients. Not only does the propagandist not care about the audience, but also may not believe in the message that is being sent. In fact, concealment of purpose may not be the only deviousness. Often, propagandists do not want their identity known.

Concealed Identity

Identity concealment is often necessary for the propagandist to achieve desired objectives and goals. The propagandist seeks to control the flow of information, manage public opinion, and manipulate behavioral patterns. These are the kinds of objectives that might not be achieved if the true intent were known or if the real source were revealed.
Control of Information Flow

Control of information flow takes the form of withholding information, releasing information at predetermined times, releasing information in juxtaposition with other information that may influence public perception, manufacturing information, communicating information to selective audiences, and distorting information. The propagandist tries to control information flow in two major ways: (a) controlling the media as a source of information distribution and (b) presenting distorted information from what appears to be a credible source. Using journalists to infiltrate the media and spread disinformation is one way to present distorted information. A public relations expert, Victoria Clarke, developed the Pentagon’s media operation, including the program to embed American journalists with American troops in Iraq in 2003–2005. This may have been intended as a form of controlling information flow because the journalists get emotionally attached to their units, thus causing their reporting to be emotional.

Slobodon Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia seized control of most of the media and used newspaper, radio, and television reports of atrocities to fan the fires of hatred on both sides during the Serbian-Croatian war in the former Yugoslavia. The reporting on Belgrade television was so biased that thousands of people staged a huge demonstration to protest. In Croatia, Tudjman removed personnel at Croatian television and the newspaper Vjesnik and replaced them with his own people.

Altheide and Johnson (1980) made a case for what they called “bureaucratic propaganda,” in which organizations as diverse as the military, television networks, and evangelical crusades release official reports containing what appears to be scientifically gathered and objective information to influential groups with the purpose of maintaining the legitimacy of the organizations and their activities. The information in the official reports is often contrived, distorted, or falsely interpreted. This information, according to Altheide and Johnson, may never be seen by the public but rather by a congressional committee or some citizens group and may be used for some action or program.

Other reasons for corporate information control are secrecy in new product development or suppression of data about products that are hazardous to human health and the environment.

Minority opinion may be suppressed to maintain an appearance of a strong base of support. Colluding sources of information that support the propagandist’s intent will be disseminated, whereas opposing sources are likely to be suppressed. When Chinese students demonstrated in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989, the government blacked out news reports of the protest to smaller cities and the countryside. Chinese citizens in these areas...
never knew about the Beijing unrest and the demands for reforms. The world saw the demonstrations because the media were in Beijing to cover Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit there. When the government brutally massacred student protestors fleeing from tanks and grenades, it distorted the truth by claiming that thugs and counterrevolutionaries had murdered soldiers of the People’s Republic of China, who fired back in self-defense. Here, the Chinese government successfully controlled information flow to its own people, but other people of the world knew about it.

Expansion of access to information around the world through new mass communication technologies has made control of information flow difficult. CNN and the BBC World Service bring television news to almost everyone except where they have been banned in Singapore, India, and China (Bogart, 1995, p. xxxiii). In the Mexican state of Chiapas, where land reforms promised following the 1919 revolution have still not been carried out, the Zapatista National Liberation Army, a revolutionary group, declared war on the Mexican army and the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The Mexican government has attempted to control the information flow to prevent sympathy for the Zapatistas; however, the revolutionaries have promulgated their cause through the World Wide Web. A Zapatista “Solidarity” page can be found at www.ezln.org, with multiple links explaining not only their cause but also the causes of other groups as well. Likewise, Htun Aung Gyaw, who was sentenced to death in absentia in Burma for leading the student resistance to the Burmese military regime and who escaped to the United States, runs the Civil Society for Burma over the Internet from Ithaca, New York (www.csburma.org). He gets information to supporters in Burma, who then smuggle it to the resistance workers. He also sends faxes to foreign companies that do business in Burma to detail the atrocities of the military regime (Ryan, 1998, p. 12).

The Management of Public Opinion

Propaganda is most often associated with the management of public opinion. Public opinion has been defined by Land and Sears (1964) as “an implicit verbal response or ‘answer’ that an individual gives in response to a particular stimulus situation in which some general ‘question’ is raised” (quoted in Mitchell, 1970, p. 62). Walter Lippmann (1922) regarded public opinion as that which emanated from persons interested in public affairs, rather than as a fixed body of individuals. He believed that public opinion was effective only if those interested persons supported or opposed the “actors” in public affairs. Speier (1950) thought public opinion exists when a unique “right” is granted to a significant portion of extragovernmental persons:
In its most attenuated form this right asserts itself as the expectation that the government will reveal and explain its decisions in order to enable people outside the government to think and talk about these decisions, or to put it in terms of democratic amenities, in order to assure “the success” of the government’s policy. (quoted in Altheide & Johnson, 1980, p. 7)

Mitchell (1970) gave four forms that public opinion usually takes: (a) popular opinion as generalized support for an institution, regime, or political system (as opposed to apathy, withdrawal, or alienation); (b) patterns of group loyalties and identifications; (c) public preferences for select leaders; and (d) intensely held opinions prevalent among a large public regarding public issues and current affairs (pp. 60–61). Mitchell likened the propagandist’s management of public opinion to “a burning glass which collects and focuses the diffused warmth of popular emotions, concentrating them upon a specific issue on which the warmth becomes heat and may reach the firing-point of revivals, risings, revolts, revolutions” (p. 111).

The Manipulation of Behavior

Ultimately, the goal of propaganda is to manipulate behavior and behavioral patterns; external rather than internal public opinion is sought. Voting, buying products, selecting entertainment, joining organizations, displaying symbols, fighting for a cause, donating to an organization, and other forms of action responses are sought from the audiences who are addressed by the persuader and the propagandist. These are overt behaviors that can be observed as both verbal and nonverbal responses.

According to Triandis (1977), other categories of behavior are attributive behavior, derived from the conclusions drawn about the internal states of others from observations of their behavior, and affective behavior, emotional reactions to people and events. An example of an attributive behavior is a manufacturer concluding, “Consumers buy our product regularly; therefore, they must like it.” Examples of affective behaviors are cheering and yelling for a political candidate and experiencing a burst of pride when the national anthem is sung. Triandis pointed out that behaviors become habits or behavioral patterns when they are performed repeatedly over a long period of time. Patterns in past behaviors or habits are fair predictors of future behaviors. In other words, they become “scripts” for behavior in similar situations. When a similar situation is encountered, carrying out the same behavior does not require a great deal of consciousness (Roloff & Miller, 1980, p. 50). Robert Coles’s book The Political Life of Children (1986), which is about how children learn about political loyalties from
language, religion, and family, tells, for example, about the children of
war-torn Northern Ireland. The Protestant children believe that God is on
their side, and Coles relates how their parents sang “God Save the Queen”
to them while rocking them to sleep in the nursery.

A propagandist or persuader will have difficulty changing behavior if the
audience already has habits to the contrary. This is especially true when a
habitual behavior is triggered by emotion (Triandis, 1977, p. 25). The point
is that behavioral change is not easy to bring about. Both persuaders and
propagandists are well aware of this and actively seek information regarding
variables related to behavioral change and predictors of behavior.

Thus, we have seen how propaganda is a form of communication and
how it uses both informative and persuasive communication concepts to
promote its own objectives by controlling the flow of information, manag-
ing public opinion, and manipulating behavioral patterns. Propaganda is a
subset of both information and persuasion. Sharing techniques with infor-
mination and persuasion but going beyond their aims, propaganda does not
seek mutual understanding or mutual fulfillment of needs. Propaganda
deliberately and systematically seeks to achieve a response that furthers the
desired intent of the propagandist.

Overview of the Book

The modern study of propaganda came about after World War I and, inter-
estingly, led the way to the social scientific study of persuasion. At the same
time, as Doob (1966) pointed out, the word propaganda became less used
and was replaced by words such as communication, information, and per-
suasion because they imply no value judgment and tend to embrace the
development of new communication technologies as well as the “intricate
perplexities inherent in developing societies and international diplomacy”
(p. vi).

The historical development of propaganda and the developing media
and audiences are the subjects of Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 reviews the
theories and research regarding persuasion and propaganda. Chapter 5 exam-
ines the use of propaganda in psychological warfare and the emerging fear
of propaganda in mass society. The remainder of the book concentrates
on modern propaganda methods of analysis (Chapter 6), four case studies
(Chapter 7), and a process model that depicts how propaganda works in
modern society (Chapter 8).